Abstract:With deeper study of the Game Theory, some conditions of Prisoner's Dilemma is no longer suitable of games in real life. So we try to develop a new model-Villager's Dilemma which has more realistic conditions to stimulate the process of game. It is emphasize that Prisoner's Dilemma is an exception which is lack of universality and the importance of rules in the game. And it puts forward that to let the rule maker take part in the game and specifies game players can stop the game as they like. This essay describes the basic model, the villager's dilemma (VD) and put some extended use of it, and points out the importance of rules and the effect it has on the result of the game. It briefly describes the disadvantage of Prisoner's Dilemma and advantage Villager's Dilemma has. It summarizes the premise and scope of application of Villager's Dilemma, and provides theory foundation for making rules for game and forecast of the future of the game.
Basic Model
In the basic model, the villager's dilemma (VD) is presented as follows: Three villagers who have the same physical strength and a robber who has two and a half times physical strength as three villagers are living in the same village. In other words, three villagers has to act together to defeat the robber who is stronger than anyone of them. Generally, each villager has 5 bags of grain produced, and they have to suffer from depredation of the robber every year. The robber follows the rule that he will take away three bags of grain from every villager per year in ordinary conditions. However, the villager who defies or resists the robber will be despoiled of all the production, and the villager who betrays the other two villagers who prefer to betray and acts as an accomplice will be rewarded of two bags of grain without any loss. If there are two betrayers, then each of them will be given one bag of grain. It is known that three villagers can communicate freely without being held back by the robber. If villagers prefer to defy or resist the robber just once, in other words, they choose to defeat the robber together, and then they will play the game repeatedly. And if the game is unavoidable, the game will become a game played between villagers and the village chief, which is an extended model detailed in Chapter Two. In Villager's Dilemma, three villagers represent game players of three parties. And the robber stands for the rule maker. Villagers are free to choose their own strategies. Meanwhile, the robber is able to make rules as he likes. This model is similar to the prisoner's dilemma at some point, while it is more approach to the real situation. We will discuss this in Chapter Four. Compared with other dilemma theory, we also assume that there are no reputaton effects from the villager's decision. And the only concern of each player (villager) is maximizing his/her own payoff, without concern for the other player's payoff. The unique equilibrium for this game is a Pareto-suboptimal solution-that is, rational choice leads the two players to both play defect even each player's individual reward would be greater if they both played cooperatively.
Which strategy does a villager should to choose if they want to minimize his/her own loss and maximize payoff? In this game, given that three villagers communicate with each other to defy before robber's coming, one of them will consider, if I choose the strategy to defy, then the optimal strategy for the other two is to betray. Then I will lose all my production because of my defiance. However, if I choose to help the robber, no matter what the other villager does, it will be better than defy. So that, betray and acts as an accomplice is the optimal strategy. It is clear that three villagers are confront with the same reality, and each of them will arrive at the conclusion that to betray and acts as an accomplice is the optimal strategy based on rational pondering. That is to say the Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is all the three villagers obey and become accomplice of the robber. Under this circumstance, each villager loses three bags of grain, while robber gets the maximum payoff. Nash equilibrium of the game above is evidently not the Pareto Optimum.
Concerning of the payoff of the three villagers as whole, if all of them choose to defy and defeat the robber, they will remain all their production-five bags of grain per person, which is a better payoff for them, other than betray in which there is just two bags of grain remained for each person. But based on the hypothesis, the three rational individuals concern of each own payoff without other's. Equilibrium of this game is three villagers choose the same strategy to obey, then payoff for each one is better than defy, but payoff for the whole is low. It's what is called 'dilemma'.
Extended model.

Result of Game Given that Abolish the Reward rule.
Let's omit the rule that ' the villager who betrays the other two villagers who prefer to betray and acts as an accomplice will be rewarded of two bags of grain without any loss'. Then we will get the result as following: At this time, the Nash equilibrium alters: three villagers will choose the strategy of defying after communicating. And the Nash Equilibrium and the Pareto Optimum arrive at the same point.
Result of Game Given that Abolish the Punishment rule.
We have found that the result of the game alters if we omit the reward rule. The most remarkable phenomenon of this strategy is that the optimal strategy is to defy without communication among them, by reason that the act of betrayal and the act of defiance must occur together. Payoff will be reduced if one chooses to obey, while it will be increased if chooses to defy. At the same time, we found that after communication, the result is not the same as before at all. Thus, three villagers will regard betray as the optimal strategy for individual! It is sure that every rational individual will not communicate with each other in advance to make other known his/her option, since the betray strategy is on the basis of knowing others will defy. However, we know that defy is the optimal strategy without communication.
Under the circumstance it is not possible to attain a table result. Therefore, we are sure to found defying is the optimal strategy after communication in the repeated game in long-run. Why result of the extended model does not correspond with Prisoner's Dilemma. The reason is that we omit the rule of reward and punishment, which actually alters the final result. The reward and punishment system is used to encourage game players to choose the strategy which the rule maker wishes them to choose other than strategies which is prohibited. At this point, there're obvious differences occur between the game players and the rule maker: 1. If there is reward, player will choose to 'betray and act as accomplice'. 2. If there is neither reward nor punishment, player will choose to 'obey'. 3. If there is punishment, player will choose to 'betray and act as accomplice'. We have found that, if only the robber make rules which are easy enough to be distinguished, Nash Equilibrium of the Prisoner's Dilemma will be achieved. It is evidentially that Villager's Dilemma is a special case of Prisoner's Dilemma. Furthermore, a number of conditions, such as prisoners cannot communicate with each other, rule maker will not be affected by the game players, the rule will stay the same are more and more inadaptable to the society.
Repercussion the alteration of rule will have on Villager's Dilemma
If we define the rule maker as boss other than robber, and use the profit made by employees, payment for boss and welfare for employees to replace the grain, then the game will have a fundamental change. Under this circumstance, rational game player and rule maker will concern of how to realize the profit maximization for collectivity instead of individuals. At this moment, rule maker and game players have changed their moods. To be more precise, it means that boss has to provide high payment and proper welfare for employees to prevent their job-hoping because it is necessary to employees. And the boss will set rules as following: If you do a bad job, then you will get less payment. If you do an average job, then you will get the basic payment. If you do a good job, then you will get extra payment.
Above is a simple model of modern corporation system. From this model we can see that you will never get rid of bosses' restraint. And you have no choice but to bargain with your boss or move to a better job. In addition, this game is doomed to be played repeatedly in your career.
In this game, everyone should not just concern of himself or herself. We all know that if the boss pays a low payment, then he will suffer from employees' job-hopping. And if an employee asks for a very high payment, he will be fired as well, or else, the corporation will be shut up for the too heavy income burden. To sum up, result of seeking personal interests is the loss of all the people's good. It is predicable that an equilibrium of the game between boss and employees will be arrived with the more games played, and a mutual benefit system will be established. In order to make the game continued, boss ought to hew to the rule: Rules must be worked out reasonably, and there are significant differences between reward and punishment. It is notable that it is required to set rules which have marked differences. First, it is necessary to estimate and analyze game players in all aspects in order to prevent errors in setting differences. For example, there is no difference to villagers that the robber robs three bags or all production of villagers if villagers need three gags of grain to survive. And at this time, the optimal strategy can not be anything but defiance. It is the same in corporate management, we have to set wage standard based on local general level of market price. 
Examples and disadvantages of Prisoner's Dilemma.
Analysis of cases
For case one, let's talk about it together with some real fact: Modern media corporation always use advertising strategy as profit mode rather than the sale of newspapers. And we find more and more newspapers begin to decrease the price of a single newspaper, even deliver newspapers freely in order to make a high price on the basis of a high broad reach. In New Zealand, the credit history is very demanding. Once there is a stain in the credit history, it is difficult for one to do anything smoothly. From A we find that payoff is quite low and even can be ignored if we choose betray. However, from B it is clear that punishment is very painful for anyone. In Villager's Dilemma, it is can be described as changing the conditions in the game, making the mode as following: Now both parties choose to collaborate, and the game reaches Nash Equilibrium. This result has disproved the deduction that 'in a non-zero sum game a Nash Equilibrium need not be a Pareto optimum'.How did the wrong deduction be produced? The result is that Prisoner's exclude rules in the game. Actually, rules will have significant effect on the result of the game. Case two has improved that rules will have significant effect on the result of the game with real-world example. And we have to remember that the rule has to be efficient rather then something useless.
Let's discuss two questions: Replace the newspapers in Case One with a Lamborghini of the latest version. Replace the laws in Case Two with Intra-industry agreements. Results: Cannot be reach collaboration because payoff of betray is extremely large. Cannot be reach collaboration because punishment is not available when Intra-industry agreements exist. These results can be found in real life. And it pointed out that Prisoner's Dilemma has an obviously problem: Prisoner's Dilemma has set fixed rules with distinguishing reward and punishment, but it is exception in real life. Prisoner's Dilemma overlook the importance of rules and effect rules have on the result of games, only considered strategies chosen by game players.
Why do some corporation choose betray which is at high risk and may be punished by Opponent rivals? We know that demand in a given period is constant. For example, the more the people to divide a pie, the less amount everyone will get. On the contrary, the less the people to divide a pie, the more amount everyone will get. That is to say, with increase of the game players, payoff will be also rise for everyone, and finally make game players tend to choose betraying. It is more appropriate in the real word, but payoff is fixed for every game player in Prisoner's Dilemma disagree with the situation in real life.
Advantage of Villager's Dilemma.
The most significant advantage that Villager's Dilemma has over Prisoner's Dilemma is that it is more approach to the virtual reality. Specifically, we have found seven advantages: There're distinguishable differences between strategies. Betray is segmented into two groups-Betray and act as accomplice which can be rewarded and obey which cannot get any rewards. The less the game layers, the more payoff will betrayer to attain. Game players are allowed to communicate with each other. Rule maker also takes part in allocation of benefit. Any participant of the game have right to stop the game. The model with three game players is easier to be used in the real-life with more than two parties in the game. Setting rules has vital effect on result of the game.
Practical significance of the model of villager's dilemma.
Villager's Dilemma is of interest to the Sociology, Politics, Management and Economics.
Result of the Game will be affected by the Rules.
In Prisoner's Dilemma, there's doubt of Adam Smith's Invisible Hand Theory. Now, it's high time to complete the conclusion. According to the demonstration above, we add one point to Adam Smith's Theory.
In the market economic with has distinguishable reward and punishment ,that is to say, one will be awarded because of behaviors benefit the party, otherwise he or she will be punished because of behaviors harm the party, everyone will finally make the party's benefit to the maximum based on the consideration of his or her own. Powerful rule maker make rules to affect game players' decision, he tries to control the result-the invisible hand, that is the market economic by making rules-the visible hand, such as laws, regulations and policies. It should be pointed out that, rules must be effective, and consideration of reward and punishment must be in related to all game players. [4] From this article we find that all dynasties are characterized by that natural calamity happened and lead to a general region of famine when one is week and dying. However, is that a dynasty will overthrow if only there's famine? In the light of history, there were frequent natural disasters before West Han Dynasty. But because emperors cared of people and the country, it weren't cause the unrest of society, instead, it raised emperor's reputation. Thus, what's the common ground of dynasties' decaying? The answer is political corruption. Let's have a look at Villager's Dilemma's use in this case: Because of natural disaster's, there was a bad harvest, every villager produced three bags of grain. However, officials are greedy, and pocketed food for victims, at the same time, put harsh duties on people, and took five bags of grain away from every people. In fact, villagers and robbers were not allowed to communicate with each other under the feudal system. Finally, villagers defied and ended up the game, so that the dynasty decayed. The Chinese Nation was considering the question: Why did people always suffer from bitter life either the country was strong or poor? Whereas America which was on the on the other side of the ocean established democratic system to get rid of the odd circle. In other words, American democratic system provided the channel for villagers and robber to communicate with each other, and robber was selected by villagers. Furthermore, villagers decay via voting rather than military force, which we called an peaceful and efficient way to resolve a contradiction.
Conclusion
Villager's Dilemma is aimed at analyze how rules made by managers will affect the result of the game of managed game players. It emphasizes the importance of rules' making. This mode provides explain and solutions of the current situation.
